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Abstract 
 
Inspection authorities such as Port State Control Memoranda of Understanding use different 
policies and targeting methods to select vessels for inspections and rely primarily on past 
inspection outcomes. One of the main goals of inspections is to improve the safety quality of 
vessels and to reduce the probability of future incidents. This study shows there is room for 
improvement in targeting vessels for inspections and in determining vessel-specific inspection 
priority areas (e.g., bridge management versus machinery related items). The proposed approach 
treats detention and incident types as separate risk dimensions and evaluates seven targeting 
methods against random selection of vessels using empirical data for 2018. The analysis is based 
on three comprehensive data streams that cover the world fleet and shows potential gains 
(reduction of false negative events) of 14-27 percent compared to random selection. This can be 
further improved by adding eight inspection priority risk areas that help inspectors to focus 
inspections by providing insight in the individual risk profile of vessels. Policy makers can 
further customize the approach by classifying the risk of vessels into categories and by selecting 
inspection targets and benchmark samples. A small application example is provided to 
demonstrate feasibility of the proposed approach for policy makers and inspection authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
This manuscript evaluates the status quo practice of the maritime industry to primarily use past 
inspection outcomes to target risky vessels for inspections (Knapp, 2006). It builds on previous 
work of Knapp and Franses (2007a), Heij et al. (2011), and Heij and Knapp (2019) to select 
vessels for inspections with the highest benefit (reduction in risk) and to treat detention and 
incident risk as separate dimensions in order to reduce false negative events. A false negative 
event is an event where the targeting method classifies a vessel as low risk but in reality this 
vessel has high risk. If a vessel is classified as low risk based on detention risk only, the vessel 
does not get targeted but can experience an incident with (very) serious consequences. If this 
happens, the inspection regime failed the opportunity to inspect the vessel and to improve its 
safety quality because inspections reduce incident risk, as is well established in the literature 
(Knapp and Franses 2007b, Bijwaard and Knapp 2009). Perepelkin et al. (2010) and Ji et al. 
(2015) demonstrate that using incident data besides detention data improves the evaluation of 
registries and subsequent selection of ships for inspections. The included incident type risks are 
those classified as total loss and very serious and serious incidents (VSS) according to IMO 
definitions (IMO, 2000). Less serious incidents and near misses are excluded here due to their 
high degree of underreporting (Hassel et al., 2011). 
The ultimate goal of inspections is raising the safety quality of vessels to prevent future incidents 
rather than preventing future detentions. By combining the two risk dimensions, false negative 
events can be reduced since the riskiest vessels benefit most from an inspection. This study is 
based on three data streams containing global incident, inspection, and ship particular data of the 
world fleet (73,905 vessels). The analysis confirms the importance of the two risk dimensions 
and the need to improve targeting ships for inspections, since during the year 2018, 60 percent 
of vessels that experienced VSS incidents were not selected for inspection up to three months 
prior to the incident. The analysis also highlights the need to improve selection of vessel-specific 
inspection priority risk areas, since 40 percent of the vessels there were inspected still had 
incidents and only 4 percent were detained. In addition, one can observe a very low correlation 
(-0.04) between the probabilities of detention and incidents (VSS) for the year 2018.  
With the above philosophy in mind to treat detention and incident (VSS) as separate risk 
dimensions and with an established need for improvement, the presented approach extends Heij 
and Knapp (2019) who consider three combined methods and use three months of empirical data 
(the first quarter of 2018) to evaluate them. The approach presented here uses five combined 
methods and evaluates them along with the eight priority areas using empirical data for the whole 
year of 2018. Furthermore, the presented approach allows for the combination of an automated 
data-driven part with qualitative aspects. Data-driven approaches have been proposed previously 
by Knapp (2006), Knapp and Franses (2008), and Li et al. (2014) but exclude other components 
included here, such as accounting for two different risk dimensions and addition of inspection 
priority areas. The data-driven part here provides the risk profiles of individual vessels for eight 
vessel inspection priority risk areas and combines detention and incident (VSS) risk into one 
metric to enhance targeting. This data-driven part can be combined with other intelligence and 
expert knowledge of inspectors to finalize inspection selection and execution. An application 
example is provided to demonstrate feasibility. 
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2. Data streams and methodology 
The analysis is based on a unique and comprehensive combination of data streams and methods 
and follows a systematic step by step approach as follows: 
− Step 1: Use logit models to estimate risk formulas based on data from 2010 to 2014 
covering the global fleet. This step builds on previous work by Knapp (2015). 
− Step 2: Use the derived risk formulas of step 1 to estimate probabilities at ship level for 
each of the four quarters of the year 2018. Ten models are selected that cover targeting and 
vessel inspection priority areas resulting in a total of 2.9 million probabilities. 
− Step 3: Use the probabilities of step 2 to calculate percentile ranks of vessels with the 
global fleet as benchmark sample and integrate these percentiles by means of five methods 
that combine detention and (VSS) incident percentiles. The percentile ranks of the 
inspection priority areas are also calculated but not combined with detention. In addition, 
percentile ranks are also used to classify vessels using five risk categories (1=very high to 
5=very low risk). The output of this step is 4.4 million percentile ranks and form the basis 
for evaluation and validation. 
− Step 4: Validate the targeting methods of step 3 against empirical data from 2018 using 
three validation variables (detention only, incidents only, and detention and incidents 
combined). 
Table 1 lists the data sources, time frames, and number of observations for the data streams that 
form the basis for the four steps mentioned above. The global inspection data comprises data from 
over seventy countries from eight Port State Control Memoranda of Understanding (MoU’s). Incident 
data had to be combined and manually reclassified using IMO definitions (IMO, 2000) since different 
data providers use different definitions of seriousness. In addition, for each incident the first event of 
the chain of events was identified since that is needed for the incident type models for the eight-vessel 
inspection priority risk areas. In addition, the various types of consequences are recorded for each 
incident. 
Table 1: Data streams and data sources used in the analysis 
Data streams used for: Time frame and number 
of observations 
Data types and sources 
Estimating risk formulas 
(incident, VSS and 
8 incident types) 
Jan 2010 to Dec 2014 
376,508 total observations 
8,874 VSS incidents Ship particular data from IHSM Global PSC inspection data 
Global incident data from IMO, IHSM and LLI Estimating risk formulas (detention) 
Jan 2010 to Dec 2014 
158,187 inspections 
6,458 detentions 
Estimating probabilities 
(detention and incident types) 
Dec 2017 to Sept 2018 
73,905 vessels per period 
295,620 for 4 periods 
Quarterly data feeds of incident, inspection and 
ship particular data from IMO, IHSM and LLI 
Validating methods Jan 2018 to Dec 2018 
1,868 inspections 
756 VSS incidents 
Global quarterly incidents and detention feeds 
(756 incidents when counting incident by 
quarter by IMO without duplicates, and 817 
incidents when counting duplicates) 
Note: All data is for the world fleet with 73,905 vessels, excluding fishing vessels and tugs, and with the following 
status codes: in service, commission, laid-up, launched, in casualty or repair, converting, US Reserve Fleet. Further, 
VSS denotes very serious and serious incidents including total loss. 
To ensure that results are not biased due to underreporting of less serious incidents and near misses 
(Hassel et al., 2011), this study concentrates on very serious (including total loss) and serious incidents 
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(VSS). Ship particular data contains standard information such as ship type, age, size, flag, company 
(e.g. beneficial owner, class society, safety management company), construction (engine information, 
ship yard country), previous incidents and inspection outcomes. Tugs and fishing vessels are excluded, 
and ship types are grouped into six main groups: general cargo, dry bulk, container, tanker, 
passenger, and other types. To estimate probabilities at ship level, the data stream contains quarterly 
data feeds for 2018 from the same sources shown in Table 1 for 73,905 vessels, which are out-of-
sample data compared to the data for 2010-2014 used to estimate the risk formulas.  
The risk formulas used in this analysis are based on logit models following the methodology of 
the selection of variables from Knapp (2015), Knapp (2006) and Knapp and Franses (2007a, b, 
2008). Table 2 lists the resulting risk models that form the basis for step 2 of the methodology. 
The incident type models serve as proxy to inspection related focus areas, where separate models 
are used for collisions, powered groundings, main engine failures, and drift groundings. 
Table 2: Models chosen for this analysis and their related risk priority inspection areas 
Acronym Model type Use of model 
DET Detention For targeting – to combine with VSS 
VSS Incident (very serious and serious) For targeting – to combine with detention 
COLL Collision (VSS) and Collision and powered groundings are both 
proxies to passage planning, bridge management, 
crew qualification 
POWGRD Powered grounding (VSS) 
ENG Main engine failures (VSS) and Engine failures and drift groundings are both 
proxies to main engine failures, black outs, 
emergency procedures 
DRFTGRD Drift grounding (VSS) 
FIRE Fire and explosion (VSS) proxy to fire related aspects, emergency 
procedures 
HULL Hull failure (VSS) proxy to maintenance related issues including 
tanks and water integrity 
LIFE Loss of life (VSS) proxy to occupational safety, safety management, 
life boats 
POL Pollution (VSS) proxy to pollution prevention and emergency 
response 
The logit model estimates the probability (p) of an event of interest such as detention or incidents 
(VSS) by means of p = exp(xb)/(1+exp(xb)), where ‘exp’ denotes the exponential function and 
‘x’ is the set of vessel-specific variables (e.g. ship type, size, age, flag, classification society, 
beneficial owner, engine designer, ship yard country). Over 500 variables (including counting 
dummies for categorical ones) are considered initially. The database to estimate the incident type 
models has one observation per vessel per year whereas the database to estimate the detention 
model has multiple observations per vessel per year since vessels can be inspected various times 
per year. The models are specified by backward elimination by removing insignificant factors (at 
the 5% significance level). The largest of the resulting models for incidents (VSS) contains 172 
variables while the smallest contains 16 (for fire and explosion). All models are estimated by 
quasi-maximum likelihood (Greene 2008) to allow for possible misspecification of the assumed 
underlying distribution function for logit models. The employed logit models are described in 
more detail in Knapp (2015) and Heij and Knapp (2019). 
Since the effect of risk factors changes over time as they proxy how industry responds to market 
conditions and legislative changes, the risk formulas need to be updated every five years. Based 
on the data from 2010 to 2014, the effects of vessel age and size for VSS incident risk are opposite 
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to those for detention risk. Since the detention model reflects actual PSC MoU decisions in 
practice, this indicates that no incident information is part of the targeting routine. This finding 
relates to one of the main messages of this paper that past incident information is relevant for 
targeting vessels for inspection to reduce future incidents (VSS). It also demonstrates that the 
inspection data is biased since it reflects the various targeting policies of coastal states. 
Step 2 involves the estimation of ship-specific probabilities using quarterly data feeds for 2018 
and using the risk formulas obtained under step 1. This was achieved by means of a customized 
software program resulting in 2.9 million probabilities that form the basis for the development 
and testing of the targeting methods shown in Table 3. The probabilities are converted into 
percentile ranks using as benchmark the global fleet in each of the four quarters. 
Table 3: Targeting methods evaluated 
Targeting methods Description 
Detention (only) Vessels are ranked by percentile ranks from detention probabilities only. 
Incidents (only) Vessels are ranked by percentile ranks from TLVSS incident type 
probability (TLVSS= total loss, very serious and serious). 
Combined methods: 
Method A (max) Vessels are ranked by the highest of the two base percentile ranks 
Method B (min) Vessels are ranked by the lowest of the two base percentile ranks 
Method C (weight) Vessels are ranked by a weight of 50/50 incident to detention  
Method D (weight) Vessels are ranked by a weight of 75/25 incident to detention 
Method E (weight) Vessels are ranked by a weight of 25/75 incident to detention 
Percentile ranks provide a useful way for policy makers to understand where a particular vessel 
stands with respect to all other vessels in the benchmark sample, which could be adjusted to 
regional preferences (e.g. all vessels that arrived in a particular region over the last 3 years) rather 
than using the global fleet as benchmark. Table 3 shows the seven targeting methods that were 
evaluated based on 4.4. million percentile ranks. 
In order to classify vessels based on their percentile ranks, five risk categories are chosen as 
shown in Table 4. The suggested target inspection coverage is flexible and can be set by policy 
makers considering the country’s (or group of countries in the case of a PSC MoU) risk appetite, 
regional priorities and resources.  
Table 4: Risk categories and target inspection coverage 
Risk Category Percentile rank Suggested target inspection coverage 
RC1: Very high risk 90 to 100 100% 
RC2: High risk 80 to 89 100% 
RC3: Medium risk 70 to 79 90% 
RC4: Low risk 60 to 69 10% random 
RC5: Very low risk 0 to 59 5% random 
To test feasibility, the suggested target inspection coverage was applied to ship arrival data for 
2018 of one country containing 34 thousand arrivals in port with average daily arrival rate of 90 
vessels and average daily inspection rate of 8 vessels. Applying the above target inspection 
coverage using method B, the same average figures were obtained, that is daily inspection rate 
of 8 vessels, making the suggested coverage feasible. At the global level and based on unique 
IMO numbers, the quarterly inspection rate is 21.2% while the yearly inspection rate is 42.6%. 
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3. Evaluation of targeting methods 
To evaluate the various proposed targeting methods, three evaluation variables were considered: 
incidents (VSS); detentions; incidents and detentions combined (the vessel was either detained 
or had an incident within the relevant time period). The evaluation time periods are specified as 
follows, since estimated probabilities are only valid up to a maximum of three months: 
− P1: Probabilities estimated as of late Dec 2017 – empirical data from Jan to March 2018 
− P2: Probabilities estimated as of late March 2018 – empirical data from April to June 2018 
− P3: Probabilities estimated as of late June 2018 – empirical data from July to Sept 2018 
− P4: Probabilities estimated as of late Sept 2018 – empirical data from Oct to Dec 2018 
One way to visualize how well the targeting methods perform compared to random selection of 
vessels is via ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves that plot the true positive rate (TPR) 
on the Y-axis against the false positive rate (FPR) on the X-axis. Figures 1 to 3 provide ROC 
curves for the three evaluation variables, zooming into the Top30% of all vessels, which 
represents the top three risk categories (RC1 to RC3). Any curve above the diagonal line (random 
selection) constitutes an improvement. Appendix A provides the complete ROC curves.  
One can observe that all methods perform better than random selection with the exception of the 
detention method (using detention only) for the evaluation variable incidents (VSS). This is 
understandable given the small correlation (-0.046) between the two which also confirms that 
vessels with a high probability of detention do not necessarily have a high probability of incident 
(VSS) and that the two need to be treated as different risk dimensions. 
 
Figure 1: ROC curve top 30% – evaluation variable incidents (VSS): total incidents 756 
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
.00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30
detention
incident (VSS)
A (max)
B (min)
C (mean)
D (75inc_25inc)
E (25inc-75det)
random
 
Note: Y-axis: true positive rate, X-axis: false positive rate 
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Figure 2: ROC curve top 30% – evaluation variable detention: total detentions 1,868 
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Note: Y-axis: true positive rate, X-axis: false positive rate 
Figure 3: ROC curve top 30% – evaluation variable VSS and detention combined: total count 2,589 
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Note: Y-axis: true positive rate, X-axis: false positive rate 
At the global level, 60.2% of all incidents (VSS) were not selected for inspection up to three 
months prior to the incident. Of the 39.8% vessels that were inspected, 4.4% were detained 
indicating that vessel inspection priority risk areas could be improved in order to focus inspection 
efforts and to reduce incidents from happening. Restricting this to very serious incidents (VS) 
only, 75.4% were not selected for inspection and 3.3% were detained. After excluding cases with 
heavy or severe weather conditions, only 42.1% (VSS) and 34.3% (VS) of vessels with incidents 
were selected for inspection up to three months prior to the incident. Method D on the other hand 
would have selected 44.8% of all vessels with VSS incidents and 39.3% of all vessels with VS 
incidents in the top three risk categories (RC1 to RC3). Taking different inspection rates into 
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account and if random selection is set to factor 1 for comparison reasons, the 44.8% classification 
rate of method D translates to 1.49 compared to random selection (44.8% divided by 30%). 
Besides visualization by ROC curves, the improvement over random selection of vessels in terms 
of reduction of the false negative rate is quantified in Table 5. Note that the false negative rate is 
the opposite of the true positive rate (in the sense that both rates add up to 100 percent). To test 
the significance of differences in success rates across methods, the Satterthwaite Welch t-test is 
performed (Appendix B shows detailed results for some methods).  
Table 5: Reduction in false negatives compared to random selection (Top 5% to Top 30% of vessels) 
Evaluation 
variable 
% 
Top 
Emp. 
Count DET VSS A B C D E 
VSS 5 756 1.0% -1.6% 0.0% -3.2% -2.7% -1.8% -1.6% 
(295,620) 10 756 1.8% -5.5% -0.5% -4.3% -3.6% -5.3% -2.6% 
 15 756 2.2% -8.9% -1.1% -6.4% -6.3% -7.6% -3.0% 
 20 756 2.3% -11.5% -3.9% -7.1% -6.9% -11.0% -1.0% 
 25 756 2.9% -14.0% -6.2% -7.4% -8.1% -12.7% -1.2% 
 30 756 3.4% -14.1% -6.0% -7.2% -8.8% -14.4% -1.4% 
Detained 5 1868 -4.2% -2.0% -3.0% -12.0% -11.8% -10.3% -9.8% 
(62,537) 10 1868 -5.9% -5.5% -4.7% -19.0% -17.9% -13.3% -15.5% 
 15 1868 -7.3% -8.6% -6.4% -22.1% -21.7% -16.4% -17.3% 
 20 1868 -9.9% -11.1% -7.3% -24.6% -22.3% -18.0% -19.0% 
 25 1868 -11.1% -13.1% -9.3% -26.5% -22.8% -19.1% -19.2% 
 30 1868 -14.0% -6.2% -10.5% -27.7% -23.4% -20.2% -19.3% 
VSS and 5 2,589 -2.7% -1.8% -2.2% -9.4% -9.1% -7.7% -7.4% 
detained 10 2,589 -3.6% -5.3% -3.4% -14.6% -13.8% -10.8% -11.8% 
combined 15 2,589 -4.5% -8.5% -4.9% -17.5% -17.1% -13.8% -13.0% 
(295,620) 20 2,589 -6.3% -11.0% -6.1% -19.6% -17.8% -15.9% -13.6% 
 25 2,589 -7.0% -13.2% -8.2% -21.0% -18.5% -17.1% -13.9% 
 30 2,589 -8.8% -15.4% -9.0% -21.9% -19.1% -18.5% -14.0% 
Note: DET=detention, VSS=incident, A (max), B(min), C(mean), D(75%incident/25% detention), E(25% incident/75% 
detention) 
The results confirm that all methods are significantly better than random selection with the 
exception of the method DET (using detention only) for the evaluation variable VSS. For the 
evaluation variable incidents (VSS), method D performs best at the Top30% level which 
combines the first three risk categories (RC 1 to 3) while method VSS performs best at the 
Top10% level (RC1) followed closely by method D. The Satterthwaite Welch t-test however 
confirms no significant difference between method VSS and method D at the Top10 or Top30% 
level but confirms that method B and using detention only vary significantly compared to method 
VSS or method D. Method D gives more weight to incidents but also accounts for detention risk 
to capture vessels that have low percentile ranks for VSS but high for detention. For the 
evaluation variable detention and combining detention with incidents, method B (min) performs 
best at the Top10% and 30% level. This is also confirmed by the Satterthwaite Welch t-test where 
method B varies significantly compared to method DET, VSS and method D at the Top10 and 
Top 30% level. 
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Figure 4 provides the mean deficiency rate and detention rate of inspected ships and the mean 
incident rate of all vessels for each of the suggested risk categories which should be higher for 
higher risk categories.  
Figure 4: Incident rate (%), detention rate (%), and mean number of deficiencies per risk category 
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Note: mean incident rate = Sum of incidents/total nr of unique vessels by RC, mean detention rate = 
sum of detentions/sum of inspections by RC, mean nr of deficiencies = sum of deficiencies/total nr of 
unique inspected vessels 
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The final part of the analysis compares observed incident types with the eight-vessel inspection 
priority risk areas. The 817 incidents (including vessels that had more than one incident per 
quarter, which is therefore more than the 756 incidents mentioned in Table 5) are manually 
checked to identify the first event of what is normally a chain of events. Since an incident can 
have multiple events and consequences, this leads to 886 outcomes (84 for VS) linked to the 
inspection priority risk areas. Vessels with high risk (RC1 to RC3) are identified and Table 6 
shows the percentage of these vessels to the total of relevant incidents for each category. Some 
incident types such as grounding, stranding and loss of life, have few observations and it is not 
possible to distinguish between powered and drift grounding with the available data, hence the 
comparison is made with grounding/stranding for this type of category using the same count. 
Table 6: % of vessels identified in risk category 1 to 3 by inspection priority risk areas (2018) 
Observed Corresponding VSS VS 
incident type/first event Inspection priority risk areas 
 
Total % RC1-RC3 Total % RC1-RC3 
Pollution Pollution 52 30.8% 3 0.0% 
Loss of life Loss of life 31 12.9% 31 12.9% 
Collision/contact Collision and Contact 202 31.2% 5 0.0% 
Fire and explosion Fire and Explosion 72 34.7% 12 25.0% 
Engine/mechanical failures Engine related failures 317 59.9% 4 50.0% 
Propulsion/Steering gear failure Drift grounding 32 34.4% - n/a 
Hull related/stranding Hull related failures 160 33.1% 19 47.4% 
Grounding/standing  Powered grounding 19 63.2% 10 70.0% 
 Drift grounding 19 57.9% 10 60.0% 
Note: For incident type related to grounding and stranding, inspection priority risk areas for powered groundings and drift 
grounding are matched since they cannot be easily distinguished from the observed data. 
In the future, vessel inspection priority risk areas can be extended by adding for instance models 
related to the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) and by producing MLC type deficiency 
probabilities. Another possible improvement is related to occupational safety type incidents and 
human error. The empirical data showed 45 such cases (21 for VS) that cannot be easily matched 
against any risk inspection priority areas at this stage but could be in the future if there is a 
separate risk model for occupational safety related incidents. 
The inspection priority risk areas can also be used to further improve targeting vessels for 
inspection in addition to using combined methods A-E. This idea was tested using the inspection 
priority risk areas of the 817 vessels that had incidents with results shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Improvement in targeting by adding priority risk areas (relative true positive hit rate) 
  
using 
methods 
adding inspection priorities showing high risk ranking (RC1 
to RC3) with at least: 
methods random alone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
detention 1 0.88 2.71 2.36 2.04 1.73 1.36 1.20 1.04 0.98 
incident (VSS) 1 1.49 2.59 2.19 1.86 1.66 1.54 1.49 1.49 1.49 
method A 1 1.20 2.65 2.26 1.90 1.60 1.33 1.23 1.22 1.20 
method B 1 1.24 2.63 2.31 2.04 1.82 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.31 
method C 1 1.29 2.60 2.27 1.97 1.74 1.49 1.42 1.34 1.32 
method D 1 1.49 2.58 2.21 1.89 1.69 1.55 1.50 1.50 1.49 
method E 1 1.06 2.68 2.35 2.03 1.76 1.44 1.32 1.20 1.15 
Additional vessels selected  343 252 177 117 58 33 16 9 
Note: The relative hit rate corrects for different inspection rates and is calculated as follows: %correctly classified/% of vessels 
inspected which is 30% for RC1 to RC3. 
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Table 7 shows the improvement compared to random selection by using the various methods 
alone and by combining them with inspection priorities that have high risk ratings (RC1 to RC3). 
For instance, for method B, improvement over random selection is 0.24 (1.24-1) compared to 
using method B alone for targeting. Using at least one of the inspection priorities that have high 
risk ranking in addition to method B, overall improvement is 1.63 (2.63-1) over random selection 
or 1.39 (2.63-1.24) compared to using method B alone. Based on Table 7, using at least 4 or more 
inspection priorities with higher risk rankings in addition to a base targeting method alone (eg. 
such as method B) seems to provide a good balance between improvement and the number of 
added vessels that would be selected for inspection as shown in the last row of Table 7. The 
selection of how many of the risk priorities need to show a higher risk rating (e.g 1, to 8) to be 
considered for inspection is up to policy makers and available resources. The inspection priority 
areas are more refined models (all restricted to VSS incidents) than the base VSS incident model 
and are worth been considered is more than 3 or 4 show high risk rating as they are also correlated 
(please refer to Appendix C) indicating if a vessel has higher risk areas in one or two areas, it 
most likely will also show higher risk ranking in other areas. 
 
4. Application example for inspectors 
The approach presented in the previous section provides a data-driven or quantitative approach 
to assist selecting vessels for inspection and focusing inspection efforts with the aim to reduce 
false negative events. The data-driven part can be combined with other intelligence and expert 
knowledge of inspectors to finalize inspection selection and execution. The procedure can be 
split up into the following three main steps, where the first two steps can be fully automated and 
the final step allows addition of qualitative knowledge and other relevant intelligence. 
− Step 1: Use risk formulas that are updated every 5 years to estimate ship-specific 
probabilities based on up-to-date data feeds that are received daily or weekly. 
− Step 2: Calculate percentile ranks relative to the relevant benchmark sample (e.g. global 
fleet or vessels that visited the relevant region during the last 3 or 5 years) and classify 
vessels into risk categories. Consider inspection priority risk areas to focus inspection 
activities and to possibly further improve selection of vessels for inspection. 
− Step 3: Combine the outcomes of steps 1 and 2 with expected arrival data in a particular 
port or wider area of interest and plan the inspection visits based on priorities and 
capacities, taking the data-driven outcome as guidance. To finalize the inspection planning, 
use other available intelligence and expert knowledge, for instance, knowledge about 
specific companies or vessels known to inspectors or the region, market economic 
conditions, or new legislative requirements. 
Risk dimensions can be shown graphically as visual assistance to inspectors. Figure 5 provides 
an example of 11 vessels that all had incidents, of which only one (container vessel 5) has been 
selected for inspection (with a resulting detention). Such graphs can be generated automatically 
showing all vessels in port liable for inspection for a particular day or time period. The graph 
shows instantly where each vessel stands with respect to the others. In this particular example, 
the targeting method using a Top-30% rule for detention only would have missed vessels 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7 and 10. If only incidents (VSS) are used for targeting, the Top-30% rule would have missed 
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vessels 2, 5, 6 and 9. When using combined methods with the addition of inspection priority 
areas, all vessels could be considered for inspection. 
This type of visualization could be complemented by a Table (refer to Table 8 for an example) 
that lists the percentile ranks of selected methods and the percentile ranks for the vessel 
inspection priority risk areas. Note that in this example, all methods are shown but in reality one 
or two would be chosen such as method B, D, VSS and detention to cover all priorities and 
focuses. 
Figure 5: Example of visualization of risk dimensions of vessels in port 
 
Table 8: Summary of percentile ranks of vessels in port 
 
Note: DET=detention, VSS=incident, COLL= collisions, DRFTGRD=drift groundings, POWGRD=powered grounding, 
ENGINE=engine related failures, FIRE=fire and explosion, HULL = hull related failures, POL = pollution, LIFE = loss of life 
With respect to the inspection priority areas, the following is of interest given that all vessels 
experienced incidents but only one was selected for inspection and detained. 
V1: tanker
V2: dry bulk
V3: LNG tanker
V4: chemical tanker
V5: container
V6: dry bulk
V7: container
V8: general cargo
V9: general cargo
V10: dry bulk
V11: dry bulk
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− Vessel 1 experienced a steering gear failure and stranded in February 2018. The percentile 
ranks for engine related failure is high (87.81) and drift grounding is medium (73.53). It 
arrived in port in January 2018 but was not inspected. 
− Vessel 3 experienced main engine failures and was towed to port in late June 2018. The 
percentile rank for engine failure is high (80.87). It arrived three times in port (April, May 
and June) but was not selected for inspection. 
− Vessel 4 experienced main engine failure and piston crown damage in late April 201. Its 
percentile rank for engine failure is high (85.20). It arrived in port four times prior to within 
90 days of the incident and was not inspected. 
− Vessel 8 experienced loss of life by mid Sept 2018. Percentile ranks of all methods are very 
high (above 90, and 94.71 for loss of life). It arrived in port twice in August, the last time 
just two weeks before the incident, but was not selected for inspection. 
− Vessel 10 ran aground late in November 2018, was re-floated and departed. It has very high 
percentile ranks for drift grounding (97.41) and hull related failures (95.32). It arrived in 
port twice before the incident and was not inspected. 
− Vessel 11 experienced engine problems late in October 2018. While its percentile rank of 
engine failure is low, the one for drift grounding is medium (78.15). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This study considers and evaluates the status quo assumption of maritime inspections such as 
PSC inspections and industry inspections to primarily use past inspection outcomes – in 
particular past detention and deficiencies – to target vessels for inspections. One of the main 
goals of inspections is to improve the safety quality of vessels and to reduce the probability of 
future incidents. In terms of targeting efficiency, the reduction of false negative events is the 
main focus. The main contributions of this study are summarized as follows: 
− While it has been established that inspections decrease future incident risk, this study 
confirms room for improvement since of all vessels that experienced incidents (VSS) in the 
year 2018, only 40% had been inspected and 4% were detained. An alternative approach to 
target vessels for inspections treats detention and incidents as separate risk dimensions. The 
very low correlation (-0.04) between the probabilities of detention and incident (VSS) at 
ship level confirms that these two dimensions measure different risk aspects. 
− Five combined targeting methods are developed and tested against random selection of 
vessels using empirical data for 2018. The results show a potential gain (reduction of false 
negative events) of 14 to 27% compared to random selection which can be further improved 
if adding vessel inspection priority risk areas to the targeting routine. The study 
demonstrates that combined methods have the potential to reduce false negative events as 
the chance to catch risky vessels is improved. In the future, different weights for incident 
type risk and detention could be tested, especially if a longer time period for testing 
becomes available.  
− The use of percentile ranks makes it possible to combine two risk dimensions and allows 
customized benchmarking of vessels, for instance, by considering vessels for a particular 
region of interest rather than the global fleet used here. Since the percentile ranks are based 
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in the benchmark sample and the probability estimates, they are dynamic in nature and 
correct for improvements of the fleet since vessels are always compared against each other 
for given overall safety quality at any given time.  
− The study presents risk categories and associated inspection target coverage, which are 
tested against arrival data of one particular country. However, these categories and target 
coverages are flexible and can be set by policy makers depending on their regional 
preferences and inspection capacities, along with the selection of the benchmark sample. 
− Incident data still has many quality issues and it remains difficult to use these data to 
validate targeting methods or to determine incident types related to inspection priority risk 
areas. This was partly overcome by restricting the data to VSS incidents and by manually 
classifying incident data from at least three different sources. In addition, it is impossible to 
measure the number of vessels that did not have incidents due to inspections or that would 
not have had an incident if they had been inspected. For the year 2018, 60% of all vessels 
with a VSS incident were not inspected in the 3 months prior to the incident, and of the 
40% that were inspected only 4% were detained. This indicates that inspection efforts and 
priorities can be improved by focusing them in a better way.  
− The eight considered vessel inspection priority risk areas provide the means to help 
inspectors in focusing their efforts, as these areas provide insight into the individual vessel 
risk profile. In the future, these areas could be extended further, for example, by adding 
Maritime Labour Convention deficiency type probabilities. 
− The data-driven part to assist with targeting and to decide how to focus inspection priorities 
can be automated. It is further simple to visualize risk dimensions and risk priorities at the 
level of vessels that are expected in a particular port or area. This can act as one component 
in the more complex process to select vessels for inspections and can be combined with 
qualitative aspects including other intelligence available and based on the inspector’s expert 
knowledge.  
It should be acknowledged that the evaluation of new methods as presented here has two 
important restrictions. First, the inspection and detention data are the product of current 
inspection strategies across the globe and are therefore biased towards current targeting regimes. 
Second, the incident data has several limitations. A true test of alternative inspection targeting 
approaches can only be obtained by actually implementing such approaches for some time to 
guide the inspection decisions and by recording the outcomes. 
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Appendix A: ROC curves without zoom 
Figure A.1: ROC curve – evaluation variable incidents (VSS): total incidents 756 
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Figure A.2: ROC curve – evaluation variable detention: total detentions 1,868 
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Figure A.3: ROC curve – evaluation variable VSS and detention: total count 2,589 
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Appendix B: P-values of the Satterthwaite Welch t-test 
Method Random DET VSS B(min) 
Very serious and serious incidents (756) 
Top10 
DET 0.2115 - - - 
VSS 0.0016 0.0000 - - 
B(min) 0.0118 0.0002 0.5158 - 
D(75inc/25det) 0.0020 0.0000 0.9433 0.5628 
Top 30      
DET 0.0878 - - - 
VSS 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
B(min) 0.0066 0.0000 0.0064 - 
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.8767 0.0040 
Detention (1,868) 
Top10 Random DET VSS B(min) 
DET 0.0000 - - - 
VSS 0.0000 0.7531 - - 
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Top 30      
DET 0.0000 - - - 
VSS 0.0000 0.1777 - - 
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0128 0.0000 
Detention and incidents combined (2,589) 
Top10 Random DET VSS B(min) 
DET 0.0001 - - - 
VSS 0.0000 0.0894 - - 
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 
Top 30      
DET 0.0000 - - - 
VSS 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0278 0.0144 
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Appendix C: Correlation of percentile ranks of vessel inspection priority risk areas 
Area COLL DRFTGRD POWGRD FIRE HULL LIFE MENGINE POL 
COLL 1.00        
DRFTGRD 0.72 1.00       
POWGRD 0.60 0.54 1.00      
FIRE 0.46 0.24 0.49 1.00     
HULL 0.36 0.27 0.56 0.77 1.00    
LIFE 0.41 0.23 0.29 0.62 0.53 1.00   
MENGINE 0.67 0.85 0.43 0.17 0.13 0.23 1.00  
POL 0.38 0.21 0.32 0.49 0.54 0.64 0.20 1.00 
Note:  COLL= collisions, DRFTGRD=drift groundings, POWGRD=powered grounding, ENGINE=engine related failures, 
FIRE=fire and explosion, HULL = hull related failures, POL = pollution, LIFE = loss of life 
 
